> [!infobox] <s class="aside-in"><em>mentioned in 1 topic, 1 evergreen</em></s> #### <s class="topic-title">[[philosophical zombie]]</s> > [!wikipedia] [philosophical zombie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical%20zombie) > > A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person but does not have [[consciousness|conscious experience]], [[qualia]], or [[sentience]]. > For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object it would not inwardly feel any pain, yet it would outwardly behave exactly as if it did feel pain, including verbally expressing pain. Relatedly, a zombie world is a hypothetical world indistinguishable from our world but in which all beings lack conscious experience. > > Philosophical zombie arguments are used in support of [[mind-body dualism]] against forms of [[physicalism]] such as [[materialism]], [[behaviorism]] and [[functionalism]]. These arguments aim to refute the possibility of any physicalist solution to the [[hard problem of consciousness]]. > ##### ^dataviews > [!dataview]+ Related unlinked notes > > No results to show for list query. > [!dataview]- Other unlinked mentions > > - [[Consciousness as awareness of experience]]